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People often evaluate how their abilities or their achievements compare to those 
of others. Such judgments tend to show asymmetric weighting: They are more influenced 
by impressions of one’s own performance than by impressions of the comparison group. 
We challenge interpretations of this effect as an egocentric focus. We show that 
asymmetry is much smaller when predicting concrete performance measures rather than 
general skill level and when the judge has experienced the task in question. We attribute 
this to a tendency to understand poorly-specified performance scales as implicitly 
relative. Moreover, judges’ modest tendency toward asymmetrical weighting may be 
adaptive, because judges often know more about their own performance than about their 
peers’. This does not mean, though, that judges are sensitive to optimality: We find that 
they are insensitive to the effects that objective feedback has on the optimal weighting of 






Judgments of performance: The relative, the absolute, and the in-between 
 
In many domains, people need to evaluate how their abilities or their 
achievements compare to those of other people. A key component in choosing which jobs 
to apply for, which slopes to ski on, or which camera to purchase is where one stands 
relative to other candidates, other skiers, or other amateur photographers. Indeed, 
research suggests that consumers often do not know their tastes in any absolute sense, but 
instead choose products based on their beliefs about how their tastes compare to others’ 
(Prelec, Wernerfelt, & Zettelmeyer, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1995). For example, a wine 
drinker may think of herself as of average sophistication, and choose seemingly average 
wines on that basis. 
Evidence suggests, however, that people do not accurately gauge their own 
relative standing in many contexts (see Alba and Hutchinson, 2000 for a comprehensive 
review). One systematic element of misjudgment is that perceptions of relative standing 
vary with the perceived difficulty of the task, even when the task is difficult or easy for 
people in general. It seems that anything that makes a task seem harder causes estimates 
of relative performance to decline. This includes manipulating the difficulty of the target 
domain (Kruger, 1999) and tightening the required precision of answers (Burson, Larrick 
& Klayman, in press). An anecdotal example comes from the Chinese national college 
examinations in 1999. Chinese students applied to colleges and universities between the 
time that they took the examination and the time they learned their results. That year, the 
examination was more difficult than usual, and most of the 50,000 students taking it 
underestimated their relative performance, leaving premier universities short of 
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applicants. As the China Daily put it “A student who is dying for entering China’s 
prestigious Qinghua University applied for an ordinary college due to his wrong 
assessment of his performance” (China Daily, 1999). Indeed, with difficult tasks one 
often sees pessimistic rather than optimistic biases: On average, people think they are 
below average (Burson et al., in press; Kruger, 1999). 
This difficulty effect reflects the tendency for judges to overweight or anchor on 
their own perceived degree of success, and to underweight their understanding of how 
well others are likely to perform (Giladi and Klar, 2002; Klar and Giladi, 1999; Klar, 
Medding, & Sarel, 1996; Kruger, 1999; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; Moore and Kim, 2003; 
Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003). Study participants show a high correlation between 
judgments of their own absolute performance and judgments about their relative 
performance (typically, judgments of the percentile into which their performance will fall 
within a specified peer group). The correlation is much weaker between estimates of peer 
performance and the participant’s relative standing. See Figure 1. 
Most investigators have attributed this asymmetric weighting to one or both of 
two psychological processes: egocentrism and focalism (Klar & Giladi, 1997; Kruger & 
Burrus, 2004; Windschitl et al., 2003). Egocentrism is implicated in that the self figures 
more prominently in judgment than do others. Focalism is implicated in that judges who 
are asked to evaluate themselves focus on the information most obviously relevant, 
namely information about themselves. Both egocentrism and focalism lead judges to put 
more weight on what they know about themselves than what they know about members 
of the comparison group That asymmetric weighting is the focus of this paper, and thus, 
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we will not need to distinguish between egocentrism and focalism; we will refer to them 
collectively as egocentric focus. 
In this paper, we challenge the hypothesis of egocentric focus on both descriptive 
and normative grounds. We hypothesize (as do Moore and Kim, 2003) that the observed 
asymmetric weighting is due, at least in part, to ambiguity in whether a particular 
judgment is meant to be absolute or relative. In particular, when judges lack a well-
learned absolute scale in a skill domain, we hypothesize that they naturally fall back on 
relative judgments. For example, how skilled are you at cleaning your kitchen? Lacking 
an appropriate absolute scale of cleaning performance, it may be natural to make a 
judgment based largely on how good you think you are compared to other people. We 
believe that some experimental judgments that have been taken to be judgments of 
absolute performance may have this quality to some degree. If so, then it is natural that 
answers to these questions correlate highly with more explicit relative judgments, such as 
percentiles. In contrast, a question like, “How often do you clean your kitchen?” is more 
unambiguously absolute, and we hypothesize that more objective performance questions 
like this will show lower correlations with relative judgments of kitchen-cleaning 
frequency. Support for this hypothesis comes from the stereotyping literature. Biernat 
(2003) argues that subjective language like that used in “skill” scales elicits comparison 
to a category. When asked to judge the intelligence of a 4-year-old, a parent will claim 
she is brilliant because the comparison is implicitly to other 4-year-olds. In contrast, the 
meaning of “common-rule” judgments (e.g., her score on a specific task) necessarily 
remain constant across contexts. Similarly, the tendency to use relative judgments to set 
the scale for absolute judgments may be greater when the question is hypothetical than 
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when the judge has direct experience with the performance in question. The appropriate 
scale of measurement may be more vague when asking, “How well do you tell jokes” 
than “How well did you tell those three jokes?” In Studies 1 and 2, we show that general 
skill questions show much more asymmetry of weights than do questions about specific 
behaviors, and that hypothetical estimates show more asymmetry than do estimates based 
on performance experience. 
We also question whether, as most investigators imply, it is optimal to put equal 
weight on estimates of one’s own performance and estimates of the average performance 
of the comparison group. Because relative judgments are necessarily based on judgments 
about the difference between one’s own performance and the average, logic seems to 
dictate weighting those equally in estimating relative performance. However, we 
hypothesize that there is a parallel here to the phenomenon once known as false 
consensus. People’s judgments about others' beliefs and attitudes correlate with their own 
beliefs and attitudes. Thus, people are systematically biased toward thinking that others 
feel as they do—a seemingly egocentric bias. However, later research showed that such a 
bias may not be an error from the point of view of the judge (Davis, Hoch, & Ragsdale, 
1986; Dawes, 1990; Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Hoch, 1987; Hoch, 1988). People are not 
very accurate in judging how their attitudes differ from those of other people. Although 
they may also misjudge their own attitudes, those are nevertheless a valid cue to what 
other people think, because there is a fair measure of actual consensus among one’s 
peers. Thus, one’s own opinions may be the best cue to others’. Indeed, Davis, Hoch, and 
Ragsdale (1986) and Hoch (1987) showed that judges could be more accurate if they 
placed even more weight on their own opinion. 
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The parallel in relative judgments is that judges may have better insight into their 
own ability at a given task than they have in the average ability of their peers, and thus 
weighing one’s own performance more heavily may improve accuracy in estimating 
relative standing. Absolute performance is certainly a predictor of relative performance, 
albeit an imperfect one. The worse one does on a test, the more likely one is to have 
performed below average. Put another way, if a task is difficult for you, that may indicate 
that it is difficult for everyone, or that it is more difficult for you than for most people. If 
it is hard to judge the former, than it is reasonable to assume that the latter is likely to be 
true, at least probabilistically. 
However, even if we can demonstrate that asymmetrical weighting is useful in 
judgments of relative standing, that does not prove that people are aware of the fact, or 
that they weight self and other appropriately. In Study 3, we show that asymmetric 
weighting may indeed be appropriate in many situations, but that judgments of relative 
ability are not sensitive to changes in the validity of information. That is, people apply 
very similar weights to the available information regardless of whether the source is their 
own intuitive estimate or objective information. Thus, it cannot be said that people follow 
an optimal weighting strategy. 
 
Study 1 
In this study, we manipulated two variables that we hypothesized would affect the 
extent to which participants treated a judgment of ability as absolute or relative. One 
variable was whether judgments concerned a general rating of skill in a domain or an 
estimate of a particular performance measure, score. Our hypothesis is that general skill 
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questions are more prone to be treated implicitly as relative judgments, whereas concrete 
score questions more clearly elicit absolute performance estimates. This should manifest 
itself in a lower correlation between estimates of one’s own performance and estimates of 
relative performance for score questions, leading to more symmetrical weighting of self 
and other in estimates of relative performance.  
The second manipulated variable was whether the judgments were made on the 
basis of only a description of the task or following experience performing the task. We 
hypothesize that estimates made without direct experience would tend to be treated as 
relative judgments, because the appropriate scale to use for absolute judgments would be 
unclear. Following experience at performing a task, we expect participants to have a 
better idea of an appropriate absolute scale of performance, and thus to give more clearly 
absolute estimates.   
Methods 
 Participants. 40 University of Chicago students were recruited with 
advertisements posted around campus and were paid $9 for their participation, which 
required approximately 45 minutes. 
Materials. We used three game-like tasks. One was a “Word Prospector” game 
like one previously used by Burson et al. (in press). In this game, the player attempts to 
construct as many four, five, and six letter words as possible from the letters contained in 
the word gorgonzola. Participants receive points for each letter of each correct word they 
spell, and lose points for nonexistent or misspelled words. For example, if a participant 
spelled the word along, five points would be counted toward the overall score. But, if the 
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participant spelled the nonexistent word gool, four points would be subtracted from the 
overall score. 
Another task was a Remote Associates Test, used by Kruger (1999). In this task, 
participants are asked to find the word that is associated with three other words. For 
instance, given the set of words “athletes—web—rabbit”, the correct answer would be 
foot. There were ten sets of words.   
For the third task, we selected a non-verbal, memorization game commonly called 
“Concentration.” This game requires participants to turn over pairs from a 6 by 6 matrix 
of cards containing a variety of pictures and symbols (in this case, represented on a 
computer monitor). Players must remember the location of the cards in order to 
consecutively turn over all matching pairs of cards as quickly as they can. Participants 
played four rounds of this game.  
Design. Task type was a within-participants variable. The order of tasks—Word 
Prospector, Remote Associates, Concentration—was not varied. We manipulated type of 
absolute dependent measure (skill or score) between participants. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a condition in which they were asked about their score or about 
their skill (e.g., for the Remote Associates Test, “On how many of the 10 sets do you 
think you would have correctly guessed the fourth word?” versus “How would you rate 
your ability to correctly guess the fourth word?”). We also manipulated between 
participants whether the questions were hypothetical or experiential. In the hypothetical 
condition, participants were given the game instructions, but did not play the games. In 
the experiential condition, estimates were made after participants played each game, but 
without receiving any additional feedback from the experimenter. 
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Procedure. Participants read several pages of instructions from the computer 
screen including an explanation of the first task (Word Prospector), an example, and the 
scoring rules for the task. In the hypothetical condition, participants next made their 
performance estimates based on how they thought they would do at the game. Those in 
the experiential condition played the game before making estimates. For them, a screen 
containing the 10-letter word “gorgonzola” and indicating the time limit (3 minutes) 
followed the instructions. They typed their list of words into the computer until the time 
limit was reached, at which point the computer ended the game.  
Following the task description and, in the experiential condition, the game itself, 
participants were asked to answer three questions about their performance on the game. 
The order of the three questions was counterbalanced. They estimated their own 
performance or ability, the average performance or ability of “other University of 
Chicago students participating in this experiment,” and the percentile rank into which 
their performance or ability would fall in relation to other participants. The use of the 
percentiles was described as follows (in this example, for Word Prospector): 
Compared to other University of Chicago students participating in this 
experiment, how successful were you at finding 4, 5, or 6 letter words in 
the word gorgonzola? Please estimate what percentile you are in compared 
to other participants in this experiment. Writing 10% means that you did 
better than only 10% of your peers, writing 90% means that you did better 
than 90% of your peers, and writing 50% means you did better than half of 
the students participating in this study. Write any percentile between 0 and 
99 in the space below. 
 
The nature of the two absolute-estimate questions varied with condition. In the 
score condition, participants estimated the number of points that they expected to receive 
and the number of points that they expected the average person to receive. In the skill 
condition, participants estimated their ability and the average person’s ability using the 
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method used previously by Kruger (1999)—a 10-point scale ranging from very unskilled 
to very skilled. Both groups estimated their relative ability using percentiles.  
Participants then repeated the procedure for the next task, Remote Associates, 
which had a six–minute time limit. They made performance estimates for that task, and 
then continued on to the Concentration game and its estimates. All participants also 
provided demographic information. Participants in the hypothetical condition stayed on 
to complete an additional experiment, which we will describe later as Study 2. 
Results 
For each of the three tasks in each of the experimental conditions, we calculated 
the path weights between estimates of one’s own absolute and own relative performance 
and between estimates of peer-average performance and own relative performance.1 We 
also determined the correlation between estimates of own and peer-average performance.  
Results are shown in Figure 2. 
For estimates of skill using a 10-point rating scale, the resulting paths clearly 
show greater weight on one’s own performance than on average performance when 
estimating relative performance. This replicates the findings reported by Kruger (1999) 
using similar questions, as well as those reported by Klar and Giladi (1999) and Kruger 
and Burrus (2004). However, we see a very different picture for estimates of scores. 
Here, participants estimates of the percentile of their performance show nearly equal 
weighting of own and average performance. These results using estimates of performance 
rather than general skill ratings are consistent with findings by Moore and Kim (2003, 
Study 3), who found less asymmetry of weights in a task requiring participants to 
estimate their number of correct answers on a trivia quiz. The variable of hypothetical 
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versus experiential basis for estimates shows little effect. However, it may be that our 
hypothetical condition was not really hypothetical enough. Participants received detailed 
task descriptions, including examples, which may have allowed them to simulate task 
experience. We examine this possibility later, in Study 2. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that Moore and Kim (2003) and we 
propose: Seeming overweighting of one’s own performance in judgments of relative skill 
may be due in large part to the fact that the rating one gives one’s own skill is already 
relative in nature. That is, the interpretation of a scale from very unskilled to very skilled 
is heavily influenced by a sense of the distribution in the reference group. What does it 
mean to have a skill of 5 in computer programming? In operating a computer mouse? 
Participants do not say that their peer-group average is exactly 5 in all cases—they are 
willing to recognize that their peers are more skilled at some tasks than at others. Yet 
even that may reflect comparison to some larger population that is used to calibrate the 
scale (see Giladi & Klar, 2002 for more on this argument). The upshot is, we propose, 
that judgments of one’s own skill already reflect a large measure of relative judgment, 
and thus it is no surprise that they correlate very highly with percentile estimates, and that 
variation in the estimated average score adds little. 
In contrast, score questions have a scale that is more clearly absolute—how many 
points scored, how many questions answered correctly. Here, we find little asymmetry. 
Participants’ judgments of the percentile of their performance are predicted almost 




Study 1 showed little impact of hypothetical versus experiential basis for 
estimates. However, in that study, even the hypothetical condition provided more 
concrete information about the task than has been provided in some other studies. For 
example, Kruger (1999) provided participants with task experience in some cases, but 
also asked participants to make estimates about their skills based only a brief description 
of the skill (e.g., “programming a computer”). So, in this study we similarly provided 
only brief definitions, and, as in Study 1, compared estimates of skill ratings versus 
estimates of performance measures. As before, we predicted that hypothetical estimates 
would show greater asymmetry because lack of experience would contribute to 
uncertainty about the appropriate scale for absolute judgments, which would in turn lead 
to a tendency to scale even one’s absolute estimates in relative terms. Naturally, since the 
questions here are based on even less task information than in Study 1, we expected any 
such effects to be stronger here than they were in the previous study. 
Methods 
 Participants. The participants were the 20 students from the hypothetical 
condition of Study 1. Because these participants did not play the games in that study, they 
completed their estimates more quickly than did those in the experiential condition. So, 
following the three tasks described in Study 1, these 20 participants were provided with 
an additional set of 12 tasks to evaluate, which provide the data for this study. They were 
paid $9 at the end for the combination of the two studies, which required approximately 
45 minutes in total. 
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Materials. We used 12 everyday tasks, similar to those used by Kruger (1999). 
These are listed on the left side of Table 1. As in Study 1, we manipulated the type of 
performance estimates asked for (skill or score), with participants randomly assigned to 
one of those two conditions. For example, in the score condition, participants received the 
question “How far can you throw a baseball (in feet)?”. In the skill condition, “How 
would you rate your ability to throw a baseball far?”. The questions used to elicit score 
estimates are shown on the right side of Table 1. Skill questions used the same 10-point 
scale as in Study 1. Judgments of relative ability used the percentile scale with which 
participants were also familiar from Study 1. 
Design. Question type (skill or score) was a between-participants variable. Task 
was manipulated within participants, with all participants receiving the 12 tasks in the 
same order. 
Procedure. Participants received no description of the 12 tasks other than what 
was provided in the question (see Table 1). They were asked to answer three questions 
about their performance on each task, regarding their own predicted performance, the 
average performance of their peers, and the percentile into which they thought their 
performance would fall. The order of these three estimates was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
Results 
We calculated path weights across task using the same statistical methods as in 
Study 1 (see Footnote 1). Results are shown in Figure 3. 
As shown in Figure 3, we find that both skill and score ratings show asymmetrical 
weighting of own and average performance in these tasks. Taken together with the results 
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of Study 1, this suggests that ratings of one’s own performance are highly correlated with 
judgments of relative performance percentile if either the estimates are made using a 
general skill scale or they are made on a purely hypothetical basis. Put differently, 
participants give nearly equal weight to their own and peer-average performance when 
they have the combination of a concrete performance metric and some exposure to the 
task requirements. This supports the hypothesis that uncertainty about the appropriate 
scale for absolute judgments leads judges to treat them more like relative judgments. 
 
Study 3 
This study examines two further questions about relative judgments: Is equal 
weighting of own and others’ performance optimal for predicting relative standing, and 
are judges sensitive to conditions that affect what the optimal weighting is? As we know 
from the not-necessarily-false-consensus literature, optimal weights in practice may not 
be the same as those that would theoretically be optimal in an error-free environment. For 
one thing, estimates about others are likely to be less accurate and reliable than estimates 
about oneself. Incorporating more poor information about others into one’s percentile 
estimates could actually make them more errorful (paralleling Hoch, 1987). We present 
an illustrative example of a situation in which this is the case. In this study, we used the 
Word Prospector game, we asked for estimates based on score, and we allowed 
participants to play the game before responding. Based on the results of our previous two 
studies, we did not expect to see a great deal of asymmetry in weighting for these tasks. 
However, we also anticipated that the optimal weighting scheme would in fact put more 
weight on estimates of one’s own performance. Thus, although the prototypical finding is 
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that judges overweight themselves and should not, we anticipated the opposite pattern in 
this case: Participants will not place much more weight on their own performance, but 
should. 
Even if people do demonstrate asymmetric weighting when asymmetric weighting 
is appropriate, that does not necessarily indicate that they are sensitive to the conditions 
that make it appropriate. In particular, the weights put on own and others’ performance 
should depend on the accuracy and reliability of each of those sources. To test judges’ 
sensitivity to these variables, we varied the accuracy of each source of information, and 
looked at how participants’ use of the sources of information varied. We did not expect 
that judges would respond appropriately to differences in information quality. We suspect 
that any tendency to put more weight on one’s own perceived performance stems from a 
general pattern of experience, rather than from an understanding of the controlling 
processes. Across life experiences, better absolute performance is in fact correlated with 
better relative performance. That is tautological, given that one’s own performance is part 
of the function that determines one’s relative performance. But the relationship is 
enhanced in people’s experience by the tendency for tests and other tasks to be 
deliberately adjusted so that the average performance is neither near the floor nor the 
ceiling. School examinations are a prime example: A low percentage of correct answers 
on a test is strongly associated with doing poorly relative to others. 
Methods 
 Participants. 95 University of Chicago students were recruited with 
advertisements posted around campus. They were paid $9 for their participation, which 
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required approximately 45 minutes. We accepted only students who had not participated 
in the previous two studies. 
Materials. In this study, we gave participants ten different Word Prospector 
problems of varying difficulty and asked them for estimates about their relative standing 
on each word individually. We varied the amount of feedback participants received about 
their own and the average participant’s scores. 
 Design. Task difficulty was manipulated within participants in two ways. Some 
words were relatively difficult to work with (e.g., petroglyph and gargantuan) and while 
some were easy to work with (e.g., typewriter and overthrown). Secondly, different time 
limits were provided to work on the words (1, 2, 3, or 4 minutes). All participants 
received all ten problems in the same order, with the same time limits. 
Feedback level varied between participants. In the self-feedback condition, 
participants were told their actual score for each word prior to making their estimates for 
that word. In the median-feedback condition, participants were told the median 
participant’s absolute score on the word after each trial. Those in the no-feedback 
condition received neither kind of information, and those in the full-feedback condition 
received both.2
Actual and optimal weights were determined individually for each participant by 
running regressions for each individual across their ten trials. 
Procedure. At the beginning of the procedure, participants read three pages of 
instructions presented on the computer screen including an explanation of the Word 
Prospector task, an example, the scoring rules for the task, and the appropriate description 
of feedback to expect. After reading the instructions, a screen containing the first 10-
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letter word and its time limit was presented. After working on the first 10-letter word for 
the allotted time, the program stopped the game, calculated the participant's score, and 
provided the feedback appropriate to the participant's condition. Participants then 
answered questions about the number of points that they expected to receive on that 
word, the number of points that they expected the average participant to receive, and the 
percentile rank into which they would fall in relation to other participants. The order of 
questions was counterbalanced across participants, and they were not asked to make 
estimates about any quantities for which they received feedback. All participants also 
estimated the difficulty of the task for themselves and for the average participant, using a 
scale from 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult).  
Participants were then allowed to continue on to the next of the ten words. After 
completing all ten trials, they were asked to estimate their percentile for Word Prospector 
tasks in general and the difficulty of the entire task for themselves and for the average 
participant, and to provide demographic information. 
Results 
Difficulty effect. Results replicate the difficulty effect reported by Kruger (1999) 
and Burson et al. (in press). Across tasks, average perceived difficulty and estimates of 
absolute performance correlated with average estimated percentile, r(23) = -.42 and .47, 
respectively, p’s < .05. 
Weighting and accuracy. We will first consider the no-feedback condition, which 
most closely resembles the information provided in earlier studies. A paired-sample t test 
showed that participants in this group did put more weight on estimates of their own 
score than the peer-average score (t(23) = 8.307, p < .001); 75% of participants did so. 
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However, estimates of one’s own score and the average score were highly correlated 
(r(24) = .95). We believe this strong correlation reflects individual differences in 
impressions about the likely results of the Word Prospector scoring system. Regardless, 
the colinearity of the two variables makes it difficult to assess their separate effects. 
Therefore, we conducted our subsequent analyses using estimates of own score and 
estimates of the difference between own and average peer score (O – P). Those two 
variables correlate more modestly (r(24) = .57). With these measures, the equivalent of 
equal weighting of own and peer performance is for O – P to correlate highly with 
estimated percentile, and estimates of one’s own performance to have no additional 
contribution to predictions of percentile. 
In one-sample t tests, the average beta weight for O – P was much greater than 
zero (MO – P = .671, t(23) = 5.119, p = .001), whereas the average beta weight for own 
score was not (Mown = .137, t(23) = .903, p = .376); participants in this condition were not 
placing very much additional weight on their own absolute performance. 
What should they have been doing, in order to maximize the accuracy of their 
predictions about the percentile into which their performance would fall? To answer this 
question, we conducted the same analyses using actual percentile of performance as the 
dependent measure to be predicted from the participants' estimates of their own score and 
O – P. Averaging across participants, the beta weight for participants’ estimates of their 
own score was marginally significantly greater than zero (Mown = .248, t(23) = 1.72, p = 
.099) whereas the beta weight for the difference between own and average score was not 
(MO – P = .04, t(23) = .262, p = .796). These results suggest that, ideally, participants 
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should not be relying on the difference between themselves and others to predict their 
percentile standing, but merely focusing on their own performance. 
Next, we looked at all four information conditions to determine how feedback 
affected participants’ weighting on absolute information. We conducted an ANOVA with 
the dependent variables being the weights given by each participant to own score and O – 
P, as in the previous analysis of the no-information condition (which is included here as 
one condition). Thus, own weight versus O – P weight was a repeated measure, and 
condition was a between-participants variable. Results are shown by the darker bars of 
Figure 4. There are two main effects that are more or less logically inevitable. A marginal 
condition main effect, F(3, 91) = 2.34, p = .079, indicates that weights in general increase 
as more information is provided (i.e., as the dependent variable becomes more 
predictable). A weighting main effect F(1, 91) = 23.98, p < .001 shows that more weight 
is put on O – P than on own score. More interesting is that there was no condition by 
weighting interaction (F(3, 91) = .084, p = .968). In other words, participants did not 
significantly adjust their weights as information became more diagnostic. 
Next, we looked at how feedback affects the optimal weighting for predicting 
percentile from estimates of O – P and own score. We expected that when objective 
information was provided on a given variable, the variables in question would optimally 
be weighted more heavily. We repeated the previous ANOVA, but using the weights for 
each participant that predicted their actual percentile rather than their estimated 
percentile. Results are shown in the lighter bars of Figure 4. There were source and 
condition main effects similar to the previous analysis. This time, though, there was a 
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condition by weighting interaction (F(3, 91) = 5.70, p = .001), indicating that that optimal 
weighting of O – P and own score did vary significantly as information was provided. 
Discussion 
The results of this study demonstrate two complementary considerations in 
interpreting the weights that judges of relative performance give to their own 
performance and that of their average peer. First, as in our previous studies, estimates of 
concrete performance standards, informed by task experience, show only modest 
asymmetry of weights. This is shown in the present study by the fact that the estimated 
difference between own and average performance largely accounts for predicted 
percentile of performance relative to peers. The additional contribution of own 
performance is small. The second consideration is, what would the optimal weighting be? 
We find that, when basing one’s predictions just on subjective estimates, it is actually not 
such a good idea to lean so heavily on the estimated self-other difference. So, in sum, 
people are not always prone to an egocentric focus, and they might sometimes be better 
off if they were. 
Looking across information conditions, we see that judges are not very sensitive 
to the effect that additional information should have on how they estimate their relative 
performance. In low-information conditions, they tend to put too much weight on all of 
their estimates. In other words, people fail to appreciate how inaccurate their estimates 
are, or they fail to appreciate that such inaccuracy implies that they should regress their 
impressions heavily toward the mean. When judges are provided with objective feedback 
concerning their own absolute performance, the median performance of their peers, or 
both, they show little change in judgmental policy, whereas of course they should. 
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Roughly speaking, people seem to make judgments as though their subjective estimates 
were as good as objective information. 
 
General Discussion 
The three studies reported here shed light on the process decision makers use to 
evaluate themselves relative to others. We show in the first study that judgments of 
relative standing are not as egocentric as some previous studies suggest. Studies such as 
Klar and Giladi (1999), Kruger (1999), and Kruger and Burrus (2004) find a very strong 
association between perceptions of one’s own abilities and perceptions of one’s abilities 
relative to others, with much less influence of perceptions of the average abilities of one’s 
peers. However, our results suggest that this stems, at least in part, from an ambiguity in 
judges’ interpretation of the question. When asked to rate their skill on an arbitrary scale 
such as 1 to 10, relative judgment is used implicitly to set the scale values. It may not 
always be the case that 5 is taken to be the precise average value for one’s peers—
sometimes a different reference group may be salient (such as those who regularly 
engage in the activity described). But still, low numbers mean “worse than most” and 
high numbers “better than most,” even if the experimenter had something more absolute 
in mind. This interpretation is supported by our findings using well-defined scales such as 
points scored or time to completion. Units on these scales can readily be defined in an 
unambiguously absolute sense, without reference to a comparison group, and judges 
show more nearly equal weighting of estimates for own and average peer performance 
when predicting relative performance. If a relative judgment is used to set the absolute 
scale values, then it is inevitable that where one puts oneself on the absolute scale will 
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correlate highly with where one puts oneself on the relative scale, without implicating an 
egocentric focus. 
The second study finds that, even when asking about scores, there is substantial 
asymmetry of weights when participants made judgments without experiencing the task 
or receiving detailed descriptions and examples. Hypothetical measures are, we conclude, 
also difficult to scale, and thus judgments of one’s score are derived, in part, from one’s 
guess about how one stands relative to others, rather than vice versa. In other words, a 
judge may have a clearer impression about where he stands relative to his peers in 
baseball throwing than he has about how far a typical baseball can be thrown. Again, this 
uncertainty about scaling will lead to a strong correlation between estimates of one’s 
absolute and relative performance without egocentric focus. 
In our final study, we examined what weighting scheme would allow participants 
to best predict their relative standing from their estimates of their own performance and 
of the peer average, or from objective information provided on one or both variables.  
Using the example of Word Prospector games with task experience, we demonstrate that 
it is not necessarily optimal to weight estimates of own and others’ performance equally. 
Generally, one has a better idea of one’s own performance than of the average 
performance of peers. Thus, it can be optimal to put more weight on the former than on 
the latter. But judges do not seem to be sensitive to the fact that this balance depends on 
the sources of information. They use virtually the same weighting scheme whether their 
information comes from subjective estimates or from objective feedback, as though 
ignoring the uncertainty in their subjective estimates or the implications of that 
uncertainty for appropriate weighting. 
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The idea of egocentric focus in judgments of relative performance or skill is 
intended to explain a very robust and interesting phenomenon, namely the tendency for 
judgments of relative ability to correlate with judgments of one’s own performance. With 
easy tasks, people on average think they are above average; with difficult tasks, people 
think they are below average. Nothing in our results contradicts this empirical finding. In 
Study 3, as well as in Burson et al. (in press), we replicate this difficulty effect even using 
concrete performance measures and task experience. Even in such tasks, there is still 
some tendency for judges to lean more on their impression of their own competence than 
they do on their impression of the average peer’s performance, and that residual 
asymmetry is enough to maintain the difficulty effect. 
When response scales have clear external referents, the amount of extra weight 
given to one’s own ability is not extreme. In fact, it turns out that a moderate degree of 
imbalance often increases accuracy rather than hurting it, a finding that is paralleled in 
the “false consensus” literature. Presumably, people have learned from life experience 
that one’s absolute performance is indeed a cue to one’s relative performance, and have 
learned to weight the former heavily in predicting the latter. But the optimal weighting of 
cues of course depends on one’s sources of information, and people do not seem to 
recognize when or why weighting one's own performance heavily is good policy. That 
means that they are likely to make systematic errors depending on what the kinds of 
experience and feedback they receive in a domain. The effects of experience and 
feedback on relative judgments are deserving of further research. Meanwhile, the present 
studies demonstrate some of the important descriptive and normative issues surrounding 
this important domain of judgment. 
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1 We used a method to determine weights that is equivalent to the LISREL method used 
by Kruger (1999). We regressed estimated percentile on estimates of own absolute 
performance and average peer performance; the path weights are the beta weights from 
that regression. The path weight between own absolute performance and average peer 
performance is the simple bivariate correlation. In order to be able to combine data from 
all three tasks, estimates for own and peer-average scores were standardized according to 
the distribution of these estimates from a given task within a given question-type by 
experience cell across participants. 
2 In order to provide realistic feedback on median performance, the self-feedback and no-
feedback conditions were run first, and the median performance from those conditions 
was reported to participants in the median-feedback and full-feedback conditions. 
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Table 1 
Tasks used in Study 2, with the question used to elicit estimates of own performance in 
the score condition. 
 
Throwing a Baseball  How far can you throw a baseball?  
Baking Bread    How many times have you baked bread? 
Recreational Reading   How many non-school books do you read in a year? 
Telling Jokes Out of 10 jokes you tell, how many will people 
laugh at? 
Calculus Problems  How many questions on a 20 question intro calc. 
test can you answer right? 
Hammering Nails What percent of nails that you hammer get bent? 
Capitals   How many of the 50 state capitals do you know? 
Car    What percent of car problems can you diagnose? 
Orderly    What percentage of your stuff is where it belongs? 
Save For every $100 that you should save, how much do 
you actually save? 
Sick How many days were you sick during the last 
school year? 
Late What percent of your social engagements are you 




Figure 1. Path weights predicting estimates of performance percentile from estimates of 
one’s own performance and estimates of average peer performance, and correlations 
between own and peer estimates, from Kruger (1999). Two asterisks indicates significant 
difference from 0, p < .01 
Figure 2. Path weights predicting estimates of performance percentile from estimates of 
one’s own performance and estimates of average peer performance, and correlations 
between own and peer estimates, by question type and task experience in Study 1. A + 
superscript indicates different from 0, p < .10; one asterisk, p < .05; two asterisks, p < 
.01. 
Figure 3. Path weights predicting estimates of performance percentile from estimates of 
one’s own performance and estimates of average peer performance, and correlations 
between own and peer estimates, by question type in Study 2. Asterisks represent values 
different from 0, p < .05. 
Figure 4. Darker bars shown the beta weights predicting estimated performance 
percentile from estimates of (own score – average peer score) and own score. Lighter 

























































































Own−Peer, observed Own, observed 
Own−Peer, optimal Own, optimal 
 
